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Abstract. The paper analyses the factors inducing retailers to adopt GM-free private 
standards, using information of 44 retailers operating in 54 countries. Retailers are 
distinguished between those not using genetically modified (GM) ingredients and 
those using ingredients which are potentially GM in their private label products. 
Results from a binary response model show that many of the drivers highlighted in the 
empirical literature, such as historical factors, communication infrastructure and 
sectorial conditions, affect the likelihood of adopting GM-free private standards. 
Moreover, we test additional hypotheses from the political economy of standards 
formation and of mass media. Key results show that a higher share of government-
oriented public media reduces the probability of adopting GM-free private standards, 
while different GMO public standards between home and operating countries increase 
this probability. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the adoption of private standards concerning product attributes significantly 
increased. Producers are increasingly asked to certify their products to comply with specific 
standards created by firms, standard setting coalitions (e.g. GFSI) and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). The goal of private standards is not only to specify the quality level and 
safety of food products (e.g. GlobalGAP, BRC, IFS), but also the attributes of the production 
process and its environmental and socio-economic effects (e.g. Rainforest Alliance and Fair 
trade). Retailers are driving the creation of private standards as they have first-hand information 
on consumers’ preferences towards different product characteristics. Moreover, they have 
incentives in developing successful marketing strategies to communicate private label product 
attributes. However, consumer preferences are not the only factor affecting the retailers’ 
decision of adopting private standards. The structure of the supply chain, the public minimum 
quality standard (MQS) set by the government and country-specific characteristics also play a 
fundamental role. 
The creation and adoption of private standards has been studied from different points of view. 
First, many authors analyzed the effects that private standards have on producers and 
smallholders in developing countries. This literature is mainly based on case studies yielding 
opposite effects.1 Second, another strand of literature analyzed the factors inducing companies 
to adopt private standards in the agri-food sector. These factors are firm-specific, and are 
conditioned by the socio-economic environment and by public policies. However, the majority 
of these studies provide qualitative analyses and their findings are mainly confined to specific 
case studies (García Martinez and Poole, 2004; Mainville et al., 2005; Codron et al., 2005). 
Third, some authors rely on the organizational innovation theory to analyze the determinants 
of the adoption of private standards at the international level. Within this literature, Neumayer 
                                                 
1
 For a review of this literature see Maertens et al. (2011). 
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and Perkins (2005) and Herzfeld et al. (2011) show that established trade relations and 
historical links with home countries, as well as infrastructure endowment and institutional 
factors are important determinants of the adoption of private standards by firms and farms. 
Among the different product characteristics, the presence of ingredients obtained by genetic 
modification has attracted consumers' attention. Despite the fact that genetically modified 
(GM) crops are successfully adopted worldwide, many NGOs and green organizations in 
developed countries argue that GM crops can have negative effects on the agricultural 
production system in developing countries and that their effects on the environment and health 
are still unclear (Takeshima and Gruère, 2011), affecting the consumers’ willingness to buy 
products containing GM ingredients. As a response to the demand for differentiated products 
not containing GM ingredients, in the middle of the nineties some European retailers started to 
adopt certified GM-free private standards, selling private label products not containing 
ingredients obtained from GM crops. GM-free standards are now increasingly spread 
worldwide. 
Specific studies on GM food private standards are provided by Gruère (2006) and Gruère and 
Sengupta (2009). The first provides important insights on the role of the public regulation in 
ensuring to consumers the ‘right to choose’ among different products in supermarkets; the 
second studies the effects of GM-free private standards on policy decisions in developing 
countries. However, none of these two studies provide quantitative evidences, neither do they 
explain why retailers may decide to adopt GM-free private standards. 
This paper aims to empirically analyze the factors affecting the retailers’ decision of adopting 
GM-free private standards, an issue largely ignored in the present literature on private 
standards. Our analysis contributes to this literature in different ways. First, we obtained an 
original sample of GM private standards for 44 retailers operating in 54 countries distributed 
in all the continents. Second, using this wide sample we tested the hypotheses highlighted by 
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the empirical literature using a binary response model. We found that historical, geographical, 
infrastructure and trade conditions significantly affect the retailer decision in adopting GM-
free private standards. Finally, we also tested additional hypotheses formulated by the 
theoretical literature on vertical differentiation, and the political economy of private standard 
formation and of mass media. Our results show that public ownership of media reduces the 
likelihood that retailers adopt GM-free standards. On the contrary, different biotech regulations 
between the home and operating country increase the probability of the adoption of GM-free 
standards by the retailer. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the theoretical 
literature explaining the formation of private standards and the political economy of mass 
media. In section 3 we present and discuss our original sample on retailers’ GM private 
standards. In sections 4 and 5 we provide hypotheses from the empirical literature and we 
explain the variables and methodology used in the econometric analysis. Section 6 provides 
the results and discusses the major findings. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background  
The theoretical analyses of the strategic adoption of private standards by firms follow two main 
approaches. The first approach uses vertical differentiation models analyzing the interaction 
between retailers and producers to explain the incentives of introducing private standards in 
the supply chain. In these models, alliances and bargaining processes in the supply chain are a 
tool to soften the price competition between retailers and to increase profits by product quality 
differentiation (Spence, 1976). These alliances enhance private standards depending on the 
structure of the production sector and of the supply market. Von Schlippenbach and Teichmann 
(2012) provide important explanations of the interactions along the supply chain. In their study, 
private standards are a tool to improve the retailers’ bargaining position with respect to 
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producers. In the vertical structure, one retailer sets a relatively high private quality standard, 
while a second retailer has an incentive to undercut its private quality standard such that the 
supplier complying with the lower quality standard loses its outside option, and vice versa . The 
result is an improved bargaining position of the low-quality retailer. The vertical differentiation 
approach is particularly relevant in the case of GM-free standards, given that the supply of non-
GM ingredients is conditional to identity preserved (IP) supply channels, which are driven by 
supply contracts and product quality certifications. 
The second approach focuses on the interaction between firm’s and government’s regulations, 
comparing the welfare effects of public vs. private standards. Private standards are strategically 
used by firms to preempt government regulations and to induce low (and less costly) public 
minimum quality standards (MQS) (Maxwell et al., 2000; Lutz et al., 2000; McCluskey and 
Winfree, 2009), choosing the quality level that minimizes the negative effects on firm’s 
revenues. Vandemoortele and Deconinck (2013) use a political economy model to show in 
which circumstances the retailer chooses a standard stricter than the public one. The decision 
depends on the retailer’s market power and on the political influence of producers. Moreover, 
other factors affect the decision of the retailer, such as the possibility for the retailer to transfer 
a smaller rent and to shift the implementation cost to producers. 
Further important factors affecting the retailers’ decision of adopting private standards are 
consumer preferences and quality perception. McCluskey and Swinnen (2004) analyzed the 
political economy of mass media and the consumer's perception toward biotechnologies. They 
showed that mass media ownership in developed countries progressively shifted from public 
to private. As a consequence, mass media objectives also shifted, from political to commercial 
objectives. The authors argue that private media tend to publish negative aspects of news items 
in order to maximize their profit, according to the "bad news hypothesis" - i.e. the marginal 
value of a piece of information with negative welfare effects is higher than the marginal value 
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of a piece of information with positive welfare effects. Thus, private media are more likely to 
deliver potential risks associated with biotechnology rather than potential benefits, affecting 
the consumers’ perception of products obtained with this technology. Curtis et al. (2008) show 
that differences in media organization and media consumption between developed and 
developing countries can explain the differences in consumer attitudes toward GMOs, ceteris 
paribus. They argue that the higher cost of information in developing countries, and the 
consequent lower consumption of information on biotechnology, can induce more favorable 
consumer’s perception of GMOs.2 The reason behind is that media in developing countries are 
often controlled by governments and the ideological influence of governments can increase the 
positive coverage of information in order to lower the risk perception of consumers. 
The central aim of our analysis is to test the main hypotheses of the above-mentioned 
theoretical literature. Specifically, the effects of the interactions between retailers and 
producers will be tested using the ratio between the agricultural value added and the food value 
added. We expect that a greater participation of the producers in the food value chain promotes 
the adoption of GM-free private standards. Second, the influence of the mass media structure 
on private GMO standards will be also taken into account. In this respect, we expect that the 
public ownership of mass media provides less incentives in delivering ‘bad news’, reducing 
consumers’ aversion to biotechnology, and, in turn, reducing the incentive for the retailer in 
adopting GM-free private standards. Finally, the interaction retailer-government will be tested 
by accounting for differences in the level of restrictiveness of public GMO standards. A strong 
heterogeneity in the public GMO regulation between the home country and the country where 
the retailer operates may induce the adoption of the private GM-free standard to overcome 
                                                 
2
 Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2004) provide evidence on the media coverage of biotech food in two rich markets, the 
Netherlands and the US. The authors show that in both markets media were generally negatively reporting on the 
potential health risks of biotech food, despite the fact that these risks were not confirmed.  
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negative effects on retailers’ revenues due to different levels of public standards across 
countries.  
 
3. Retailers’ private GMO standards 
3.1 Sample selection 
We collected an original sample of GMO private standards for 44 retailers groups, consisting 
of 174 different supermarket brands that include all types of stores, from hypermarkets to 
express stores. Our sample represents about 74% of the world food retailers, ranked according 
to the value of retail sales in 2008 (Deloitte, 2009). Table 1 reports the complete list of retailers 
in the sample. 
We collected publicly available retailers’ statements on their global GMO policies, applying 
three different strategies in gathering data. First, we collected retailers statements contained in 
annual financial and sustainability reports of the year 2009 (published in 2010) or of the closest 
year available. Second, we collected similar statements from retailers’ web pages accessed in 
the period between April and July 2010. Finally, we contacted the retailers’ customer services 
in the same period, asking for explanation of unclear statements and for missing information. 
The focus of the sample is on GM-free standards on private label products, which represent a 
direct link between supermarkets and suppliers. Organic products are not treated in the sample, 
assuming that they are all GM-free being subject to certification processes that do not allow 
for the use of GM ingredients.  
We distinguished between countries where the retailer groups are based (home country) and 
countries where the retailer groups have stores (operating country). Retailers are concentrated 
in 12 home countries. 26 retailer groups are based in Europe, 16 in North America and 2 in 
Oceania. The overall 44 retailers have stores in 53 countries distributed over all the continents. 
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Table 2 shows the geographical distribution of our countries. Almost half of them are 
developing or emerging, largely located in Asia and Latin America. 
European retailers have a wider geographical diffusion with stores in 44 countries. The high 
internationalization of European retailers can be due to the internal market structure as well as 
to historical factors such as past colonial expansion. 
In contrast, North American retailers are mainly focused on their domestic markets, since they 
are present in only 15 countries of which 7 in South and Central America. North American 
retailers can rely on a larger domestic market, which reduces internal competition and the need 
of internationalization as a growth strategy. 
Note that each retailer may have different standards in the different countries where it operates. 
Retailers do not always explicitly provide information on differentiated standards in the 
different markets (see next section for examples on standards’ differentiation) hence we assume 
that the global standard is applied in those cases where a more specific standard is not 
indicated3. 
 
3.2 Retailers’ private GMO standards 
We divided the sample of retailers into three categories (see Table 3). Category 1 includes 
retailers not adopting GMO private standards and showing no objections to the use of GM 
ingredients. In the second category, retailers do not have a specific GM-free standard, but they 
do not label their products as “Containing GMOs”, following the country’s regulation on 
labeling threshold. This means that the retailers in category 2 can (potentially) made use of GM 
ingredients, but in quantities below the labeling threshold, so that no label is needed, even in a 
mandatory labeling regime. In the third category we include retailers stating not to use GM 
                                                 
3
 In some situation, different standards may be applied even at regional level. For example, Edeka does not have 
a common policy for Germany. The policy differs by region as Edeka is divided in South, North, West and East 
Germany. 
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ingredients in their private label products (GM-free). Not all the retailers in this category use 
GM-free labels. Indeed, many retailers are reticent in committing with GM-free labels, even if 
they rely on non-GM IP supply chains to ensure non-GM ingredients in their products.4 
The world top ten retailers included in our sample are divided over the categories ‘GM-free’ 
and ‘potential use of GM ingredients’. None of them are oriented to the use of GM ingredients. 
Only 3 retailers state that they do not have objections to the responsible use of GM ingredients. 
Two of them (Safeway and Kesko) operate only on the local markets, suggesting that their 
decision is closely linked to local consumers' preferences. The third (Koninklijie Ahold) 
operates in the Netherlands and in the US, that are more open to the use of GMOs. Moreover, 
the Ahold’s position on GM ingredients takes into account the local regulations (see Table 4), 
adapting its strategy to the consumers preferences in the different countries. 
Retailers in category 2 are 20 and the largest majority of them are based in North America5. 
Their behavior is particularly sensitive. Many retailers are not willing to take a defined position 
on GMOs - i.e. adopting GM-free labels - because of uncertainties both on the supply and on 
the demand side. On the one hand, the firm who adopts the GM-free label must purchase 
constant amounts of non-GM IP ingredients from one year to the other, and this is not easy to 
achieve on the traditional markets. To be provided with constant amounts of non-GM IP 
ingredients, the firm must create new and reliable supply channels that are conditional on 
business-to-business contracts and on certifications. Moreover, these supply channels increase 
economic and logistic burdens due to IP and products traceability. On the other hand, the label 
“Containing GMOs” can be perceived by consumers as a hazard warning, even if the GM 
                                                 
4
 In order to provide a more comprehensive picture, we decided to collect retailers’ internal policies statements 
rather than the simple adoption of GM-free labels, because the latter can show only partial GM-free private 
strategies. 
5
 Using the same methodology described in Section 3.1, we also checked the attitude on the use of GM ingredients 
of some major food multinationals (Nestlé, Kraft, Unilever and PespiCo) and fast-food restaurants (Mc Donald’s, 
Starbucks and Pizza Hut). Both food multinationals and fast-food restaurants fall under category two. In particular, 
fast food restaurants are more consumers oriented, explicitly declaring that the major factor driving their GM 
standards is consumers' preferences. For example, Mc Donald’s uses GM-free ingredients in its European 
restaurants, while it does not apply this standard in the US. 
10 
 
ingredients have been approved by the regulatory institutions after a health and environmental 
risk assessment. This warning effect can affect not only the sales of the labeled product, but 
also the consumer’s perception of the overall retailer’s “way to do business”. Hence, many 
retailers prefer to remain on the “safe side”, continuing to purchase the ingredients for their 
private label products on the traditional market and building the consumer’s confidence relying 
on the public regulation remaining below the labeling threshold (Tillie et al., 2012).6 
Moreover, there is a substantial difference in labeling GM-free animal products such as meat, 
eggs and dairy rather than plant products such as fresh produce and cooking oil made from 
corn and soybeans. While the latter may directly contain detectable GMO traces, the former 
consists of products from animals fed with non-GM feed, and it is impossible to detect GMO 
traces in the final product. Therefore, the certification for labeling animal products relies 
exclusively on the segregation of the supply chain. This involves more actors (from the 
collection, transportation, storage and compound feed sectors), each of them representing a 
potential source of admixture between GM and non-GM grains and subject to laboratory 
analyses to check compliance with non-GM requirements. 
Retailers who have a GM-free standard (category 3) are 21, the large majority of them based 
in Europe. European retailers have driven the adoption of GM-free labels since the early 2000s. 
In 2004 Austria and Germany adopted the Gentechnik-frei erzeugt (GM-free produce) label for 
animal products, like dairy, poultry and pork, which progressively spread to other EU countries. 
In 2008 Germany enforced the EGGenTDurchfG Act that provided a legal base to GM-free 
labels7. More recently, in January 2012, France adopted a new decree (Sans OGM) that 
                                                 
6
 The threshold established by the European regulation (above which a product must be labeled as containing 
GMOs) is 0.9%, while it is 1% in China, Australia and Brazil, 3% in South Korea and Malaysia, and 5% in Japan 
and Indonesia. The US and Canada have a voluntary labeling regime. 
7
 The German Law on the Execution of Genetic Engineering, i.e. EG-Gentechnik-Durchfuehrungsgesetz 
(EGGenTDurchfG), was emitted in 2004 as implementation of the EU regulation 1829/2003/EG. However, only 
in 2008 food products could be labelled as GM-free (Ohne Gentechnik) under the EGGenTDurchfG act. 
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establishes rules for GM-free labels at national level. These two regulations will likely boost 
the adoption of GM-free labels also in other European countries. 
The fact that most European retailers have a GM-free standard and that the European retailers 
included in category 2 remain below the 0.9% threshold suggests that GM private standards in 
Europe are stricter than public ones, in line with the theoretical findings of Vandemoortele and 
Deconinck (2013). However, this is not the case for North American retailers. According to 
the public regulation, US and Canadian supermarkets do not adopt specific standards on GM 
ingredients.  
As already mentioned in the previous section, retailers’ private standards may change in 
different markets, adopting the best strategy according to consumer preferences and public 
standards. For example, Tesco, which has its core business in Europe, adopts a GM-free 
standard globally, but with the exception of China and US where Tesco allows the use of GM 
ingredients (Table 4). In the same way, Delhaize avoids adopting specific GM standards, 
except in Europe where it adopts a GM-free private label. 
Finally, some retailers belonging to the same group apply different approaches. For example, 
the Walmart Group has stores all over the world, but only in the UK a GM-free standard was 
implemented under the brand of ASDA. DIA, which is part of the Carrefour Group, declares 
to comply with public regulation while Carrefour sells GM-free private label products. 
Similarly, while Ahold global position is rather open to biotechnologies, the Ahold’s joint 
venture Jerónimo Martins, with stores in Poland and Portugal, has a GM-free standard. 
 
 
4. Hypotheses and data description 
From the sample described above, we developed a binary dependent variable based on the 
retailers’ statement about GMO private standards. While the meaning of a GM-free standard 
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is straightforward, for the empirical analysis the distinction between category 1 ‘no objection 
to GMOs’ and 2 ‘potential adoption of GMOs’ is not similarly relevant, given that both may 
imply the use of GM ingredients, at least in very low quantities below the threshold level. 
Hence, we combined the sample into two groups: retailers adopting GM-free standards and 
retailers not doing it. The resulting categorical variable is called GM-free and describes the 
behavior of the retailer concerning GMO private standards in the countries where he has stores, 
hence the unit of our analysis is the pair retailer-country. The dependent variable takes value 
equal to 1 if the retailer uses GM-free ingredients in private label products in the country; and 
0 otherwise. 
The explanatory variables are selected on the basis of the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Following Herzfeld et al. (2011), we selected four country’s characteristics potentially 
influencing the retailer’s choice to adopt GM-free standards: historical and geographical 
conditions, infrastructures, sectorial conditions and the quality of institutions and economic 
development. Table 5 reports summary statistics of the variables used. 
Historical and geographical factors affect cultural characteristics and information flows 
between countries, affecting, in turn, consumers’ preferences and firms’ behavior. Moreover, 
these factors may ease the transfer of new technologies and standards explaining their potential 
adoption (Neumayer and Perkins, 2005). To test for historical and geographical conditions, we 
used two variables. First, a dummy variable on Common language to control for cultural and 
historical factors, equal to 1 if home and operating country share the official language. We 
expect that sharing the official language increases the likelihood of the adoption of the standard, 
due to easier transfer of the standard from one country to the other. Second, we control for the 
country size using the logarithm of the population (Population). The common language dummy 
variable is taken from the CEPII Gravity dataset developed by Head et al. (2010); while the 
data on population is from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
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Infrastructure factors may affect the adoption of a private standard in different ways. On the 
one hand, the country’s provision of transport infrastructure affects internal and export 
transports costs, influencing firms’ competitiveness both on the domestic and on the 
international markets. Moreover, the provision of transportation infrastructure affects the costs 
of segregation between GM and non-GM products carried by the retailer. On the other hand, 
information and communication infrastructures are vital to access information on export 
requirements and on competitiveness strategies of other firms (Herzfeld et al., 2011). Access 
to telephones, faxes, e-mail and internet increases the likelihood of interactions between 
adopters and potential adopters in different countries, promoting the global diffusion of 
business strategies and standards (Neumayer and Perkins, 2005). The development of the 
country transportation infrastructures is taken into account using the Road density per square 
kilometer (WDI), while we use the Telephone lines per 100 people (WDI) as a proxy for 
information and communication infrastructures. 
Sectorial characteristics are mainly captured by the country position on the international 
markets. International trade is not only a mean for the exchange of goods and services, but also 
a source of networks enhancing the transfer of knowledge and new practices. We used three 
variables. First, the agricultural export share (Agexpsh) that measures the relative importance 
of agricultural exports with respect to total exports. Countries with well-established agricultural 
exports have greater integration in the international market and higher comparative advantage 
in agricultural production (Herzfeld et al., 2011). Second, given that intense trade relations can 
induce homogenous organizational practices (Neumayer and Perkins, 2005), we use the 
logarithm of the agricultural bilateral exports (Agbilexp) between home and operating country. 
Finally, the share of agricultural products export on total exports to the European Union, the 
US and Japan (AgexpEUJ). These markets are highly competitive, promoting product 
differentiation strategies across retailers. Moreover, the high-income consumers can be more 
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willing to pay a price premium for higher-quality differentiated products (Gruère et al., 2009). 
Trade data are from the UN COMTRADE, through the WITS service provided by the World 
Bank. In order to avoid endogeneity bias, the trade variables are calculated for the year 1995, 
prior to the introduction of the first commercial GM crop in 19968. 
The fourth factor, the institutional environment, can shape market characteristics influencing 
the retailer behavior. To control the role of public institutions we used the Rule of law index, 
from the World Bank Governance Indicators database (see Kaufmann et al., 2007). This index 
indicates the effectiveness and the predictability of the judiciary system and the enforceability 
of contracts. It ranges between 0 and 5, with higher values for higher institutions quality. 
Empirical evidences suggest that quality management systems at firm-level are fostered by 
high-quality institutional environment (Correa et al., 2008), hence, similarly, we expect that 
better institutions encourage the adoption of the private standard. 
Following Herzfeld et al. (2011), we also used the logarithm of the GDP per capita (GDPpc) 
to control for the level of economic development. For retailers in developing countries there 
can be potential disadvantages in adopting private standards due to prohibitive transaction 
costs. We tested also a possible non-linear relationship of the level of the economic 
development using the squared logarithm of the GDP per capita (GDPpc2). 
In addition to the above variables proposed by Herzfeld et al. (2011), we also used a set of 
variables particularly relevant for the analysis of GM-free private standards. 
First we used a variable on the presence in the country of green NGOs. Their campaigns can 
influence the preferences of consumers (Gruère et al., 2009), and, as a consequence, the 
decision of the retailer to adopt GM-free private standards. We considered two major green 
NGOs particularly active on anti-GMOs campaigns: “Greenpeace” and “Friends of the Earth”. 
                                                 
8
 The first commercially grown GM crop was the Flavr Savr tomato of the Calgene Company in 1994, but its 
diffusion was limited. The first extensive GM crop appeared in 1996, and it was the Roundup Ready herbicide-
tolerant soybean of the Monsanto Company. 
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The variable is equal to 0 if none of the two is present in the country; 1 if only one is present 
and 2 if both are present. 
Second, to control for the structure of the supply chain and for the bargaining power among 
producers and retailers (von Schlippenbach and Teichmann, 2012), we used the variable Value 
added, calculated as the ratio between agricultural value-added and food value-added (WDI). 
A common interpretation for this ratio is that lower values measure the ‘maturity’ of the agri-
food sector and, other things been equal, it is affected by the country economic development 
(European Commission, 2009). Developing countries often have higher values of this ratio, 
because in the initial steps of the development process their agricultural value-added grows at 
higher rates than their food industry value-added, and vice-versa in more developed countries. 
In our model we directly control for the level of development using the GDP per capita, hence 
the Value added variable captures its differential effect, which is the repartition of the value-
added along the supply chain. Since we control for development, higher Value added indicates 
that the agricultural sector has greater participation in the creation of value along the food 
chain. This increased role of the primary agricultural commodities in the food value-chain 
results in the primary sector’s greater bargaining power, thanks to better organization of the 
farmers, to the production of higher quantities or quality (e.g. organic; fresh produce), or to the 
specialization in niche products (European Commission, 2009). 
Third, we tested the hypotheses formulated by the theoretical literature on the political 
economy of mass media using the share of the public press on total press (Press) taken from 
Djankov et al. (2003). Vigani and Olper (2013) show that in rich countries, the competition 
between commercial media induces information bias on food safety issues that translates into 
a policy bias, namely more stringent GMO standards. According to the theoretical arguments 
of Curtis et al. (2008) and the empirical evidences of Vigani and Olper (2013), we expect that 
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a higher share of public press would negatively affect the adoption of GM-free private 
standards. 
Fourth, we relaxed the assumption made in Section 3.1 that the retailers adopt the global 
standard in all the countries where it has stores, adding two variables. The first, 
Internationalization, consists in the number of countries where the retailer has stores. It 
controls both for the level of international competitiveness of the retailer and for the probability 
that, at increasing number of countries, he adopts different standards to satisfy different 
consumers’ preferences. The second, Heterogeneous standards, is a variable equal to 1 when 
we have the information that the retailer adopts different GM standards in at least one country; 
and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for unobserved heterogeneous standards for those 
retailers of which we have a proof they use different standards. 
Finally, in order to account for the interaction between private and public GMO standards, we 
used an index on the restrictiveness of the GMO public regulation (GMO index), developed by 
Vigani et al. (2012) and Vigani and Olper (2013). The GMO index ranges between 0 and 1, 
where higher values indicate a more restrictive GMO regulation. We computed a regulatory 
distance between countries, obtained as the absolute deviation of the GMO index between the 
home (i) and the operating country (j), namely GMOij = |GMOi – GMOj|. We expect that higher 
heterogeneity in regulation between countries induces the retailer to adopt the private standard 
in order to choose the quality level that minimizes the negative effects on costs and revenues 
(McCluskey and Winfree, 2009). Moreover, different levels in the restrictiveness of the 
regulation may increase the incentives of the retailer to not use GM ingredients in order to 
avoid product transfer interruptions due to asynchronous and asymmetric approvals. 
Because the GMO index may suffer of causality issues (the public standard may influence the 
adoption of the private standard, vice versa the presence of private standards on the markets 
may influence the formation of public standards), the GMO index will be treated as endogenous 
17 
 
and instrumented with the GMO index of the five neighboring countries weighted by the 
distance (see Vigani et al. 2012). 
With the exception of trade and GMO index variables, all the other explanatory variables are 
taken for the year 2005 (or closest). This lagged period with respect to the dependent variable, 
which refers to information we collected in 2010, allows us to clean for further potential 
endogeneity issues. 
 
5. Econometric strategy 
To explain the retailers’ choice between different GMO private standards we used a binary 
response model to measure the retailer’s probability to opt for the GM-free private standard, 
taking into account the country’s characteristics.  
The dependent variable yij, can take on the following values: 
yij = 1 if the ith retailer in the jth country chooses a GM-free standard; 
yij = 0 otherwise. 
The binary response probability is given by: 
P(yij=1|x) = G(βo+β1xij+…+β16xij)+εij = G(β0+xβ)                            (1) 
Where β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated and x represents a vector of country j 
characteristics. Equation 1 is estimated using a Probit model, with maximum likelihood 
estimators (MLE), where the probability of the retailer i to adopt a GM-free standard in the 
country j depends on all the exogenous variables that describe the countries’ characteristics.  
We tested three different specifications of this model. The first specification includes in the 
vector x the following variables: (1) Common language; (2) Population; (3) Road; (4) 
Telephone; (5) Agexpsh; (6) Agbilexp; (7) AgexpEUJ; (8) Rule of law; (9) GDPpc; (10) 
GDPpc2; (11) Green; (12) Value added and (13) Press. The selection of these variables relies 
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on the hypotheses on the probability of adopting GM-free standards discussed in the previous 
section. 
In the second and third specification we augmented the vector x by adding the variables (14) 
Internationalization and (15) Heterogeneous strategy. The inclusion of these two variables 
allowed controlling for specific limitations of our sample. Since it was not always possible to 
collect information on each retailer brand in each country and we had to rely on retailers’ global 
statements, we control for unobserved heterogeneity in the GM-free standard of retailers with 
these two variables. 
In the third specification we added also the bilateral variable (16) GMO index, to observe the 
probability that different public standards across countries affect the adoption of GM-free 
private standards by retailers. As underlined in the theoretical literature, the use of private 
standards is linked to the level of public standards. However, public standards can be different 
between the home and operating country, affecting the retailer strategy in adopting private 
standards. 
The same theoretical literature highlights that private standards are strategically used by firms 
to influence the output of the government in setting public standards. Because of this double 
causality influence between public and private standards, we also estimated Equation 1 using 
an instrumental variable Probit (IV Probit). In order to account for the potential endogeneity 
bias of the GMO index, we used the GMO index of the five neighboring countries weighted by 
the distance as an instrument. 
Finally, in all the specifications we included regional dummies (for EU countries, Asia, Latin 
America, North America and Middle East) to control for any other omitted factors. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
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The results of the econometric model are shown in Table 6. Overall, the magnitude of the 
coefficients and the marginal probability effects are consistent across specifications, thus the 
results of columns 1, 2 and 3 tend to confirm the stability of the basic model. Similar effects 
can be detected in column 4, where using IV Probit we account for potential endogeneity of 
the GMO index.9 Overall, the majority of the hypotheses developed in Section 4 are confirmed, 
in particular the important role of the structure of the media sector and of the public policies in 
the adoption of GM-free private standards by retailers. 
Starting from historical and geographical variables, in columns 1, 2 and 3 we find that when 
the home and operating country have common language, the likelihood that the retailer adopts 
a GM-free standard increases of about 22-24%. The common language enhances the spread of 
the standard, both as a result of easier transfer of new commercial strategies and of shared 
consumers and firms characteristics. In contrast, in columns 1 and 2 the country size has a 
significant negative effect on the likelihood of adopting GM-free private standards. This can 
be due to a more complex stratification of the (large) population that makes difficult to identify 
clear standards preferences. 
Looking at the results of infrastructure variables, we obtain deeper understanding of the effect 
of the country size. In column 1, a higher share of Roads reduces the likelihood of adopting 
GM-free standards. Each additional km of roads for squared km reduces the likelihood of 
adopting GM-free private standards of about 10%. The negative effect found on Road is in line 
with the result of Herzfeld et al. (2011) that used a similar variable to study the adoption of 
                                                 
9
 We used two tests for checking for potential endogeneity of the GMO index in specification 3. Because the 
theory of the diagnostics is not developed for IV Probit or any other nonlinear model, we report tests results for 
the corresponding linear probability model, since instruments for diagnostics are a property of the first stage, 
which is common both to IV linear and non-linear estimators. The first test is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH), 
which tests for the consistency of the model. Its null-hypothesis is that the coefficient of residuals of endogenous 
variable is 0. From the results of the DWH test, we reject at 1% significance level the null-hypothesis that GMO 
index is exogenous, hence the OLS estimator is not consistent. Second, we used the Endogeneity test provided by 
the STATA command ivreg2 (defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics). The null hypothesis is 
that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. We reject the null-hypothesis at 
1% level, confirming that the GMO index must be treated as endogenous. 
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GlobalGAP certificates by countries. However, this effect loses significance in specification 
(2) and (3). Thus, we have only weak evidences that a more complex infrastructure (in 
particular in large countries) can reduce the incentive of adopting a GM-free standard due to 
higher compliance costs of segregation measures. In contrast, a greater endowment of 
information infrastructure, such as telephone lines, significantly increases the likelihood of 
adopting a GM-free standard, confirming the hypothesis that more information facilities 
enhance the firm’s integration on the international competitive markets. The variable 
Telephone is significant at 1% level in all the specifications.  
The next group of variables suggests that the country trade position can be an important factor 
affecting the retailer’s decision of adopting GM-free standards. In particular, high trade flows 
between home and operating country have a negative effect on the probability of adopting GM-
free standards, even though with a small marginal effect. The Agbilexp variable is always 
negative and significant at 5 or 10% in columns 1 and 4 respectively. Indeed, well established 
trade relationships may oppose the introduction of a standard that increases trade costs due to 
IP chains. On the contrary, the country comparative advantage in exporting agricultural 
products and the higher share of agricultural exports to rich markets (i.e. European Union, 
Japan and the US) do not seem to have a decisive role in driving the adoption of GM-free 
private standards. 
None of the results on the quality of institutions, the level of development and the presence of 
green NGOs are statistically confirmed, while the role of the value chain and of the public press 
yielded important results. 
The variable Value added is positive and significant at 1% level in all specifications. With a 
larger share of agricultural value-added, the likelihood of adopting the GM-free standard 
increases from 15% to 24%, depending on the specification. This confirms our hypothesis and 
also the findings of the theoretical literature on vertical differentiation strategies (von 
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Schlippenbach and Teichmann, 2012). Better farmers organization and high-quality and niche 
productions, resulting in higher share of the overall value of the food chain and in greater 
bargaining position of upstream farmers, enhance producers to afford low productive and more 
costly GM-free productions (Wesseler et al., 2011), and to obtain production risks mitigation 
tools, such as supply contracts. 
The hypotheses from the political economy of mass media are also confirmed. In all the 
specifications, results show that an increase in the public ownership of the domestic 
newspapers decreases the likelihood of adopting GM-free standards, and this effect is 
significant and particularly strong. This suggests that, since public media tend to transmit 
information with a less negative view with respect to private media in order to soften food 
safety concerns (Curtis et al., 2008), public media tend to lower the consumers’ aversion 
towards GM products, reducing the incentives for retailers to sell GM-free products. 
Retailers with higher level of internationalization and showing different private GM-free 
standards in different countries are less likely to adopt GM-free standards. The coefficients on 
Internationalization and Heterogeneous strategy are always negative and statistically 
significant in columns 2, 3 and 4. This suggests that if the retailer operates in numerous 
markets, its willingness to adopt restrictive GM private standards (implying greater segregation 
costs) is lower than for retailers dependent to smaller local markets. 
Finally, we tested the effect of the difference in biotech regulation between the home and 
operating country. An increase in the regulatory difference between countries strongly 
increases the probability that the retailer adopts GM-free private standards. This result confirms 
the hypotheses of the theoretical literature on the interaction between private and public 
standards. In the presence of heterogeneous GMO regulations, the retailer is more likely to 
adopt its own private standard, setting the quality level that minimizes the negative effects on 
revenues. Moreover, in order to exploit their private label products in different markets, the 
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best strategy is to sell products not containing GM ingredients. This allows the retailer to avoid 
problems such as asynchronous or asymmetric approval while transferring private label 
products from one country to the other, allowing exploiting the non-GM IP supply channel to 
a larger (international) scale, without incurring in different labeling thresholds. The adoption 
of a single (restrictive) private standard at large scale permits to overcome compliance and 
logistic costs due to different public MQS levels in different countries, obtaining homogeneous 
products for markets with different regulations. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on private standards, investigating the 
determinants of the adoption of GM-free private standards by retailers. 
First, we provide an original sample of GMOs private standards for 44 retailers, showing that 
these standards can be clustered into three groups: retailers not adopting GM-free standards; 
retailers following the public regulation on labeling threshold and retailers using GM-free 
private standards. Second, we tested four groups of variables from the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the private standard formation: historical and geographical factors; infrastructure; 
sectorial conditions and the quality of institutions and economic development. As key results, 
we found that a greater participation of the primary sector to the creation of value-added in the 
food chain induces the adoption of GM-free private standards. Moreover, a greater share of 
public media decreases the consumers’ aversion towards GMOs, reducing the incentives for 
retailers to sell GM-free products. Finally, uncertainties at public regulation level, in the form 
of heterogeneous public standards between countries, induce the retailer to adopt private 
standards in order to voluntarily choose the quality level that minimizes the negative effects on 
revenues. 
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Besides identifying the factors inducing retailers to adopt GM-free standards, our results raise 
also important issues on the environmental and economic sustainability of these standards. 
First, the environmental effects of the GM-free production are questionable when the loss of 
the potential environmental benefits from GM crops is considered. GM crops can have 
important direct and indirect environmental benefits, especially for developing countries, such 
as the reduction of pesticide applications, lower pressure on land use and lower on-farm fuel 
consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Wesseler et al., 2011). All these 
environmental benefits are potentially lost in the GM-free production. 
Second, market actors deciding to participate in the GM-free supply chain face two different 
sources of uncertainties, concerning commercial relationships and market stability.  
In the first case, the sourcing of non-GM IP products by retailers requires long-term contracts 
for certified non-GM products and it is costly due to segregation measures, lower productivity 
and higher inputs use of non-GM crops. In front of these problems, the European retailers 
recently took two opposite strategies. The first strategy consists in reinforce the relationships 
with producers. For example, on May 2013, a group of 13 European retailers launched the 
initiative “Brussels Soy Declaration”, in order to support the Brazilian cultivation of GM-free 
soybean, reducing costs and creating a stronger link with Brazilian producers for the sourcing 
of GM-free products in the long run. In contrast, the second strategy is to reverse the private 
standard. Indeed, in the last two years several UK retailers (ASDA, Morrisons, Tesco, The 
Cooperative, Marks & Spencer and Sainsbury’s) abandoned their GM-free requirements on 
poultry products, because of the difficulties of UK farmers in sourcing enough GM-free feed. 
The abandoning of the GM-free standard was condemned by green groups, accusing the UK 
retailers of betray their promises to customers. Hence, GM-free private standards are 
abandoned because not sustainable in the long run, but at higher costs in terms of public image 
and creating unreliable commercial relationships with producers. 
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The second source of uncertainty, the market stability, derives from the possible shrink of the 
EU imports of GM-free protein crops. The EU is currently a net importer of non-GM soya, but 
the EU is seeking higher self-sufficiency through the recent reform of the CAP that included 
voluntary ‘coupled’ direct payments for protein crops. In Europe there are no authorized GM 
protein crops, hence any cultivable protein crop is non-GM, and the expected higher internal 
production of non-GM soya consequent to subsidization would reduce the EU demand for GM-
free protein crops from foreign exporting countries. 
What is most interesting is that all the above described scenarios have large economic impacts 
on both farmers and market actors in developing countries deciding to produce GM-free. On 
the one hand, farmers in developing countries can lose important economic benefits derived 
from the use of GM crops, such as increased yields and simplified crop management, and, 
consequently, lose important contribution toward food security. On the other hand, the creation 
of a non-GM supply chain generates fixed and variable costs for market actors in developing 
countries, potentially balanced by price-premiums and market access. Therefore, an 
unexpected break of the GM-free production (either due to companies abandoning the GM-
free standard or to lower market demand) would provoke the effective loss of the investments 
on segregation and certification infrastructures. 
Given the above mentioned economic and environmental effects of GM-free private standards, 
more research is needed in this field. In particular, the effects of the adoption of GM-free 
private standards by food multinationals and global fast food restaurants is widely ignored in 
the literature, despite the fact that these companies are vital in shaping the global agri-food 
supply and demand. 
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Table 1: List of retailers groups and private GMO standards, ordered by retail sales according to 
Deloitte, 2009. 
 
    Source: own data collection. See text for explanation.  
Home Country Retailer Main Markets GMO Private Standard
1 USA Walmart US, Latin America Potential use of GM ingredients
2 FRA Carrefour Group Europe, Latin America GM-free
3 DEU Metro Group Global Potential use of GM ingredients
4 GBR Tesco Global GM-free
5 USA The Kroger Company US Potential use of GM ingredients
6 DEU Aldi Group Europe, US GM-free
7 DEU Rewe Group Germany, Austria Potential use of GM ingredients
8 FRA Auchan Group Europe GM-free
9 FRA E. Leclerc Europe GM-free
10 DEU Edeka Group Germany GM-free
11 USA Safeway North America No objection to GM ingredients
12 FRA Casino Group Europe, Latin America GM-free
13 NLD Koninklijke Ahold US, the Netherlands No objection to GM ingredients
14 AUS Woolworths Oceania Potential use of GM ingredients
15 USA SuperValu US Potential use of GM ingredients
16 AUS Coles Group Australia GM-free
17 GBR J Sainsbury UK GM-free
18 GBR Morrison Supermarkets UK GM-free
19 BEL Delhaize "Le Lion" US, Europe Potential use of GM ingredients
20 FRA Systeme U France GM-free
21 USA Publix Supermarkets US Potential use of GM ingredients
22 CAN Loblaw Companies Canada Potential use of GM ingredients
23 CHE Migros Group Switzerland GM-free
24 ITA COOP Italy Italy GM-free
25 GBR Marks & Spencer Global GM-free
26 CHE Coop Switzerland Switzerland GM-free
27 USA Meijer US Potential use of GM ingredients
28 DEU Tengelmann Group Germany GM-free
29 SWE ICA Group Sweden, Norway Potential use of GM ingredients
30 FIN Kesko Finland No objection to GM ingredients
31 USA Dollar General US Potential use of GM ingredients
32 GBR Somerfield Stores UK GM-free
33 USA Giant Eagle US Potential use of GM ingredients
34 USA Whole Foods Markets US GM-free
35 ITA Esselunga Italy Potential use of GM ingredients
36 USA Winn-Dixie US Potential use of GM ingredients
37 FRA Cora Group Europe GM-free
38 USA ShopRite US Potential use of GM ingredients
39 USA Hyvee US Potential use of GM ingredients
40 ITA Mdo Italy GM-free
41 USA Roundy's Supermarkets US GM-free
42 USA Nash Finch Company US Potential use of GM ingredients
43 ITA Selex Group Italy Potential use of GM ingredients
44 CAN Sobeys Canada GM-free
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Table 2: Number of countries in the sample grouped in geographical regions. 
 
  Note: Classification based on the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Report, April 2012. 
 
 
Operating Markets Developing\Emerging Developed Tot
Africa 1 0 1
Asia 8 2 10
Europe 5 21 26
Middle East 2 0 2
North America 0 2 2
Central America 4 0 4
South America 6 0 6
Oceania 0 2 2
Tot 26 27 53
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Table 3: Number of retailers grouped in GMO private standard and geographical regions. 
 
    Source: own data collection. See text for explanation.  
 
 
 
 
Home
None objections    
to GM ingredients
Potential adoption     
of GM GM-free
Europe 2 6 18
North America 1 13 2
Oceania 0 1 1
Total 3 20 21
Numbers of Retailers
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Table 4 – Examples of retailers’ statements on GMO private standards 
 
 
Retailer Home Country Statement on GMOs Source
ALDI Australia 
(ALDI Group)
Germany "We have achieved 'green' status for our Genetically Modified
(GM) policy in Greenpeace's True Food Guide. ALDI
complies with all existing regulatory requirements pertaining to
GM as stated in the Australia New Zealand Food Standards
Code. ALDI does not stock any products which are labeled
as containing GM ingredients."
ALDI Australia Website 
(accessed 28/05/2010)
DIA            
(Carrefour Group)
France "…DIA complies with current legislation, guaranteeing that
products do not consist of, nor have they been produced
from, ingredients that contain more than 0.9% GMO. To
guarantee its compliance, the company demands certificates
from all its suppliers and carries out periodic analyses of all its
products."
DIA Annual Report 2007
J Sainsbury UK "At Sainsbury’s we do not permit the use of genetically
modified crops, ingredients, additives or derivatives in our
own-brand food, drink, pet food, dietary supplements and
floral products. We work closely with our suppliers, who are
subject to our strict approval and audit processes, to ensure
that our GM policy is adhered to at every step of the supply
chain. We require the supply chain to be identity preserved."
Media FAQs November 
2009
Royal Ahold Nederlands "Where there are clear, demonstrable benefits to consumers,
Ahold has no objections to the responsible use of safe
biotechnology. Products we offer which are made with this
technology are products which are approved by the
authorities, based on a safety and environmental impact
assessment. We differentiate our assortment from country to
country in line with consumer demand."
Ahold Wbsite         
(accessed 07/04/2010)
Safeway USA "Today's agricultural and food industries are using genetic
engineering to develop new and better foods and food-related
products. [...] You may not be able to tell when you're buying
GM foods, because the FDA generally doesn't require
manufacturers and producers to label them as such. That's
because GM foods are considered no different in quality or
safety from conventionally produced foods."
Safeway Website 
(accessed 05/06/2010)
Tesco UK "We have a non-GM ingredient policy for our own-brand
foods in 11 of the countries in which we operate.[…] In China
and the US we do allow some GM ingredients in our own-
brand products. In the US, due to high levels of GM soy and
maize, it would be virtually impossible to segregate products
according to whether they did or did not contain GM
ingredients. "
Corporate Responsibility 
Report 2009
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Table 5 – Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables. 
  
     Note: See text for variables explanation. 
 
 
Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent:
GM-free 338 0 1 0.57 0.50
Independent:
Common language 338 0 1 0.11 0.31
Population 338 13.05 20.99 17.62 1.52
Road 338 0 4.96 1.01 0.91
Telephone 338 1 69.00 38.57 18.05
Agexpsh 338 0.01 0.91 0.20 0.17
Agbilexp 338 0 16.64 8.22 6.28
AgshEUJ 338 0.005 0.95 0.22 0.20
Rule of law 338 1.28 4.45 3.20 0.90
GDPpc 338 5.37 11.09 9.40 1.32
GDPpc2 338 28.79 123.07 90.00 23.13
Green 338 0 2 1.72 0.50
Value added 314 0.01 0.91 0.20 0.17
Press 313 0 1 0.04 0.19
Internationalization 338 1 23 11.79 7.00
Heterogeneous standards 338 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
GMO index 321 0 0.60 0.12 0.15
GMO index instrument 321 0 0.48 0.12 0.16
Variable
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Table 6 – Results from the Probit and IV Probit models. 
 
Note: In parentheses robust standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Each regression includes regional fixed effects for Asia, the EU, Middle East, North and Latin America. 
 
Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx
Hist. and geogr. conditions
Common language 0.788** 0.229 0.910** 0.241 0.833** 0.217 0.607 0.222
(0.356) (0.375) (0.385) (0.378)
Population -0.216*  -0.063 -0.226*  -0.060 -0.188 -0.049 -0.135 -0.053
(0.116) (0.128) (0.126) (0.119)
Infrastructure
Road -0.333** -0.097 -0.222 -0.059 -0.214 -0.056 -0.149 -0.059
(0.138) (0.141) (0.141) (0.139)
Telephone 0.062*** 0.018 0.075*** 0.020 0.073*** 0.019 0.054** 0.021
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Trade
Agexpsh -3.859 -1.122 -4.303 -1.138 -3.124 -0.815 3.348 1.324
(6.405) (6.685) (6.904) (6.672)
Agbilexp -0.039** -0.011 -0.006 -0.002 -0.015 -0.004 -0.035*  -0.014
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
AgshEUJ 1.690 0.491 2.121 0.561 0.673 0.176 -5.515 -2.181
(5.084) (5.348) (5.554) (5.422)
Instit. quality and GDP pc
Rule of law -0.515 -0.150 -0.444 -0.118 -0.388 -0.101 -0.242 -0.096
(0.326) (0.343) (0.348) (0.330)
GDPpc 0.817 0.238 2.068 0.547 2.137 0.558 2.496 0.987
(2.202) (2.338) (2.300) (2.188)
GDPpc2 -0.068 -0.020 -0.152 -0.040 -0.150 -0.039 -0.153 -0.061
(0.125) (0.132) (0.131) (0.125)
Additional variables
Green 0.506 0.147 0.433 0.115 0.394 0.103 0.196 0.077
(0.333) (0.347) (0.360) (0.349)
Value added 0.062*** 0.018 0.057*** 0.015 0.065*** 0.017 0.060*** 0.024
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Press -3.112*** -0.905 -3.448*** -0.912 -3.264*** -0.851 -2.117** -0.837
(0.895) (0.942) (0.979) (0.998)
Internationalization -0.073*** -0.019 -0.073*** -0.019 -0.064*** -0.025
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Heterogeneous standards -0.473** -0.125 -0.484** -0.126 -0.551*** -0.217
(0.202) (0.201) (0.196)
GMO index 2.240*  0.584 6.677*** 2.641
(1.190) (1.446)
1.765 -2.596 -4.209 -7.972
(11.090) (11.970) (11.710) (11.070)
YES YES YES YES
-151.360 -137.793 -134.984
0.251 0.318 0.328
295 295 293 293
IV ProbitDependent: GM-free
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit
Observations
Probit Probit
Log-likelihood
Constant
Regional fixed effects
Pseudo R-sqared
